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Surveillance and outbreak reports
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On 31 May 2011, after notification of Klebsiella pneu-
moniae (KP)OXA-48;CTX-M-15 in two patients, nosocomial 
transmission was suspected in a Dutch hospital. 
Hospital-wide infection control measures and an out-
break investigation were initiated. A total of 72,147 
patients were categorised into groups based on risk 
of OXA-48 colonisation or infection, and 7,527 were 
screened for EnterobacteriaceaeOXA-48 by polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR). Stored KP isolates (n=408) were 
retrospectively tested for OXA-48 and CTX-M-1 group 
extended-spectrum beta-lactamases (ESBL). 285 KP 
isolates from retrospective and prospective patient 
screening were genotyped by amplified fragment 
length polymorphism (AFLP). 41 isolates harbouring 
different Enterobacteriaceae species were analysed by 
plasmid multilocus sequence typing (pMLST). No noso-
comial transmission of EnterobacteriaceaeOXA-48 was 
detected after 18 July 2011. EnterobacteriaceaeOXA-48 
were found in 118 patients (KP (n=99), Escherichia coli 
(n=56), ≥1 EnterobacteriaceaeOXA-48 species (n=52)), 
of whom 21 had clinical infections. 39/41 (95%) of 
OXA-48 containing plasmids were identical in pMLST. 
Minimum inhibitory concentrations (MICs) of KPOXA-48 
and E.  coliOXA-48 for imipenem and meropenem ranged 
from ≤1 to ≥16 mg/L, and 153/157 (97%) had MIC 
>0.25 mg/L for ertapenem. AFLP identified a cluster 
of 203 genetically linked isolates (62 KPOXA-48;CTX-M15; 
107 KPCTX-M-15; 34 KPOXA-48). The ‘oldest’ KPCTX-M-15 and 
KPOXA-48 clonal types originated from February 2009 
and September 2010, respectively. The last presumed 
outbreak-related KPOXA-48 was detected in April 2012. 
Uncontrolled transmission of KPCTX-M-15 evolved into a 
nosocomial outbreak of KPOXA-48;CTX-M15 with large phe-
notypical heterogeneity. Although the outbreak was 
successfully controlled, the contribution of individual 
containment measures and of the hospital relocating 
into a new building just before outbreak notification 
was impossible to quantify.
Introduction
The number of infections caused by Enterobacteriaceae 
producing extended-spectrum beta-lactamases 
(ESBL), such as for example those with CTX-M-1 group 
ESBL and/or carbapenemases is rapidly increas-
ing worldwide [1-3]. Carbapenem resistance in 
Enterobacteriaceae is mainly caused by production of 
one of three groups of carbapenemases: Ambler class A 
(Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC)), B (met-
allo-beta-lactamases, e.g. Verona integron-encoded 
metallo-beta-lactamase (VIM), New Delhi metallo-beta-
lactamase (NDM)), and D (oxacillinases, e.g. OXA-48), 
usually in combination with ESBL-production.
OXA-48 oxacillinase was identified for the first time in 
a K. pneumoniae isolate from Istanbul, Turkey in 2001 
[4], and patients infected or carrying such bacteria 
have been reported from Asia [5], north Africa [6-8], 
South Africa [9], Europe [10-12] and north America [13]. 
OXA-48 has also been described in Escherichia coli, 
Enterobacter cloacae, and Citrobacter freundii and hos-
pital outbreaks have been reported across Europe and 
the northern part of Africa [6,7,10-12,14,15]. Hospital 
outbreaks in western-European countries, such as 
France and Spain have been linked to transfer of 
patients from hospitals in endemic countries, such as 
Turkey and Morocco [8,12,16,17].
In 2008 sporadic events of K.  pneumoniae with ESBL 
phenotypes occurred in a Dutch hospital (hospital  A). 
Subsequently, in February 2009 two clonal type 
K.  pneumoniaeCTX-M-15 isolates were identified and the 
occurrence of this clonal type gradually increased 
since, despite implementation of several control meas-
ures to interrupt transmission.
In May 2011, K.  pneumoniaeOXA-48;CTX-M-15 was notified 
in two patients after discharge from hospital A. As 
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K.  pneumoniaeOXA-48 were only detected only sporadi-
cally in Dutch hospitals, the coincidence of this finding 
was considered highly suggestive for nosocomial trans-
mission. This initiated a retrospective and prospective 
investigation to determine the potential spread and 
the number of patients colonised and/or infected with 
Enterobacteriaceae harbouring OXA-48. There was, 
in parallel, implementation of a hospital-wide out-
break containment strategy. Moreover microbiological 
studies were undertaken to determine associations 
between K. pneumoniaeOXA-48 and previously identified 
K.  pneumoniaeCTX-M-15 isolates. Here, we describe the 
sequence of events, effects of intervention and results 
from microbiological investigation of the, to our knowl-
edge, largest nosocomial outbreak of K.  pneumoniae-
OXA-48 in Europe so far. 
Methods
Setting
Hospital A is a secondary care hospital. Until 16 May 
2011 care was provided at two locations. Acute care 
was given in location 1, with 340 beds and a 12-bed 
intensive care unit (ICU), and non-acute care was con-
centrated in location 2 with 242 beds and a seven-bed 
ICU. On 16 May 2011, the entire hospital was moved to 
a new building physically separated from the two past 
locations. Coincidentally to the move, the total number 
of beds provided by the hospital changed, whereby the 
new building comprises 602 beds and 16 ICU beds.
Following the notification of two patients on 31 May 
2011, with K. pneumoniaeOXA-48;CTX-M15 growing from clini-
cal cultures, after hospitalisation in hospital A, an out-
break investigation was initiated on 1 June 2011. 
Infection control measures
As soon as the outbreak investigation started, the 
hospital received immediate assistance in outbreak 
control from four members of the National Institute of 
Health and the Environment and from three experts 
of the department of Medical Microbiology of the 
University Medical Center (UMC) Utrecht from 30 June 
2011 onwards. The Dutch guideline for highly resistant 
microorganisms (HRMO) was implemented throughout 
the hospital starting from 30 June [18]. This included 
patient screening for EnterobacteriaceaeOXA-48 and pre-
emptively isolating patients from defined risk catego-
ries (see below) upon admission. Patients with HRMO 
were also isolated. 
Cohorting of dedicated nursing staff was not applied. 
However, communication between the departments 
of medical microbiology and infection prevention and 
other healthcare personnel was intensified. Adherence 
to basic infection control measures was pursued 
through regular instruction meetings at hospital wards, 
but was not quantified. During the initial phases of out-
break control, between 7 and 27 June 2011, all ICU staff 
members (80 nurses and 16 physicians) were screened 
using both throat and rectal swabs, and none were 
found positive for OXA-48. In addition, 26 environmen-
tal samples were obtained in ICU in July 2011 (includ-
ing air filters and objects in rooms of OXA-48 carriers). 
As these environmental samples tested negative for 
OXA-48, cleaning procedures, which after 1 June had 
remained as prior to the outbreak, were not subse-
quently changed and elimination of colonisation in 
patients was not attempted. There was no intervention 
on antibiotic stewardship, and patients with infections 
were treated according to standard antimicrobial treat-
ment policy. Healthcare personnel and environmental 
screening was not repeated.
Categorisation of patients 
Based on the emergence of K.  pneumoniae with ESBL 
phenotype in hospital A since early 2009, start and end 
of the outbreak period were – arbitrarily – defined as 
1 July 2009 and 18 July 2011, respectively (see results). 
Patients with a clinical culture (taken because of a 
clinical suspicion of infection by treating physician) or 
screening culture (taken with the purpose of detect-
ing OXA-48 carriage, without a clinical suspicion of 
infection) taken after 1 January 2009, containing PCR-
confirmed OXA-48 positive Enterobacteriaceae, exclud-
ing Shewanella spp., were considered OXA-48 carriers. 
The status of OXA-48 carrier was maintained unless 
six consecutive screening cultures from the patient 
performed every two months were negative (i.e. 1 year 
negative).
Other patients were classified in three groups based 
on risk of OXA-48 colonisation or infection (Table 1). 
•	High-risk	 patients	 comprised	 (i)	 patients	 who	 had	
shared a hospital room with an OXA-48 carrier during 
the outbreak period or had been admitted to a room 
from which an OXA-48 carrier had been discharged 
within the previous two hours and (ii) all patients 
identified since 1 July 2009 with Enterobacteriaceae 
having minimum inhibitory concentrations (MICs) 
for imipenem ≥2mg/L or meropenem ≥0.5 mg/L, as 
detected by the Vitek 2 system (bioMérieux, Marcy 
l’Etoile, France). If the later patients had been hos-
pitalised, individuals who had shared a room with 
such patients or had been in the same room within 
two hours after discharge and/or transfer to another 
room of such patients were also considered as 
belonging to the high risk group. 
•	Medium-risk	 patients	 comprised	 patients	 who	 had	
been admitted to hospital A during the outbreak 
period, but did not meet high-risk criteria. 
•	Low-risk	 patients	 included	 patients	 who	 had	 not	
been hospitalised in hospital A during the outbreak 
period. These patients were considered not to be 
exposed to OXA-48 carriers. 
Patients were flagged accordingly in the electronic 
patient record system, which provided automatic pop-
ups for OXA-48 carriers, high-risk, and medium-risk 
patients, in order to allow adequate precautions as 
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Retrospective screening included PCR-based screen-
ing of OXA-48 and CTX-M group 1 ESBL of all K. pneu-
moniae isolates that had been stored since 1 January 
2009. There was protocolised storage of all clinical 
isolates from blood cultures (irrespective of antibiotic 
susceptibility) and of all clinical isolates with an ESBL 
phenotype, supplemented with isolates with otherwise 
notable antibiograms. Retrospective screening started 
mid-May 2011 as the presence of carbapenemases 
was, based on phenotype, suspected in some clinical 
K. pneumoniae isolates.
Prospective screening
Prospective screening for EnterobacteriaceaeOXA-48 
included obtaining swabs (Amies Agar Gel 108C, 
Copan) on three consecutive days from rectum, throat 
and possible infection sites, such as wounds, sputum, 
and urine, when applicable. After outbreak notifica-
tion, hospitalised patients were screened using con-
ventional culture techniques, and high-throughput 
PCR-based screening for OXA-48 started on 10 June 
2011. 
•	Patients	 in	 the	 high-risk	 group	 were	 screened	 on	
readmission when hospitalised, and if not hospital-
ised through post-discharge screening. For this, non-
hospitalised high-risk patients received information 
and material for sampling that could be returned 
through mail. High-risk patients were not recalled to 
the hospital to be screened.  
•	Patients	in	the	medium-risk	group	were	screened	on	
readmission when hospitalised.  
•	Patients	 in	 the	 low	risk	group	were	not	screened	on	
admission. 
To detect unnoticed OXA-48 transmission in the hos-










Definition Identification strategy Barrier precautions
OXA-48 carrier 
(118) NA NA
Patients with a clinical culture (taken because 
of a clinical suspicion of infection by treating 
physician) or screening culture (taken with the 
purpose of detecting OXA-48 carriage, without 
a clinical suspicion of infection) taken after 1 Jan 
2009, containing PCR-confirmed OXA-48 positive 
Enterobacteriaceae, excluding Shewanella spp.
The status of OXA-48 carrier was maintained 
unless six consecutive screening cultures from 
the patient performed every two months were 




Masks during high 
risk interventions
High-risk
(4,722) 3,394 (72) 35 (1)
Shared room with or was in same room within 2 
hours after discharge and/or transfer to another 
room of OXA-48 carrier
Had Enterobacteriaceae in clinical sample with 
MIC for imipenem ≥2 mg/L or meropenem ≥0.5 
mg/L, or shared room with or was in same room 
within 2 hours after discharge and/or transfer to 






From Jun 2011 to Jan 2012 




Masks during high 
risk interventions
Medium-risk 
(67,361) 4,133 (6) 8 (<1)
Was admitted to hospital A during outbreak period 
(1 Jul 2009–18 Jul 2011), and did not fulfil criteria 




From Jun 2011 to Jan 2012 





Low-risk (ND) 1,921 (NA) 4c (<1) Was not admitted to hospital A during outbreak period (1 Jul 2009–18 Jul 2011)
Point-prevalence surveys
From Jun 2011 to Jan 2012 





MIC: minimum inhibitory concentration; NA: not applicable; ND: not determined; PCR: polymerase chain reaction.
a Single room or cohorting with other high-risk patients, if insufficient availability of single rooms.
b Cohorting with patients in the same risk group.
c Not epidemiologically linked to outbreak.
Table 1
Risk group classification of patients during an outbreak of OXA-48 positive Enterobacteriaceae in a hospital, Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands, 2009–2011
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days, including low risk patients and high/medium 
risk patients, were screened weekly from June 2011 
onwards (until January 2012). 
Microbiology
Screening patients and isolates for OXA-48
Screening swabs were inoculated – overnight – in 
broth containing ertapenem (0.125 mg/L). 
A robotised PCR-procedure was designed 
using the following primers: OXA-48 Forward 
5’-GCGTGGTTAAGGATGAACAC-3’, OXA-48 Reverse 
5’-CATCAAGTTCAACCCAACCG-3’, and OXA-48 probe, 
labelled with 6-carboxyfluorescein (FAM), 5’-FAM-
AGCCATGCTGACCGAAGCCAATG-3’, generating a DNA 
fragment of 438 bp. This PCR was modified from Poirel 
et al. [19]. 
In case of PCR positivity, isolates, regardless of the 
retrospective or prospective sampling procedure, were 
cultured on carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae 
(CRE) agar (Oxoid Brilliance CRE Agar) and McConkey 
agar (Oxoid), and the presence of OXA-48 was recon-
firmed by PCR in every morphologically different iso-
late, to a maximum of six colonies (Figure 1). Validation 
of this procedure before large-scale application yielded 
100% specificity. 
MICs for amikacin, cefepime, cefotaxime, ciprofloxa-
cin, gentamicin, imipenem, meropenem, and trimetho-
prim/sulfamethoxazole were determined by automated 
susceptibility testing (Vitek 2) and MIC for ertapenem 
was determined by Etest (bioMérieux, Marcy l’Etoile, 
France). 
Screening OXA-48 positive isolates for extended-
spectrum beta-lactamases phenotype
For all isolates found to be OXA-48 positive by the 
method above (Figure 1), ESBL phenotype was veri-
fied. ESBL phenotype was defined as a MIC ≥1 mg/L for 
cefotaxime, or ceftazidime, and confirmation results 
of disk diffusion using cefepime, cefotaxime, and cef-
tazidime, with and without clavulanic acid according to 
national guidelines [20].
Screening Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates with extended-
spectrum beta-lactamases for CTX-M group 1
Regardless of whether they were obtained from ret-
rospective of prospective screening, K.  pneumoniae 
isolates with ESBL phenotype (only 1st isolate per 
patient) were tested by PCR for CTX-M group 1 (prim-
ers: Forward 5’-GCTGGACTGCCTGCTTCCT-3’, Reverse 
5’- CGTTGGTGGTGCCATAG(C/T)CA-3’, and minor groove 
binder (MGB) probe 5’-CCGCTGCCGGTCTTATC-MGB-3’), 
and CTX-M group 1 isolates were sequenced or tested 
with gene-specific PCR for CTX-M-15. 
Molecular investigation of the outbreak 
CTX-M group 1 and/or OXA-48 K. pneumoniae isolates 
were genotyped using amplified fragment length poly-
morphism (AFLP) [21,22]. Similarity was defined as 
≥85% resemblance (Dice). AFLP typing was performed 
for all K.  pneumoniae isolates included in retrospec-
tive screening, as well as for K.  pneumoniae isolates 
detected through prospective screening. 
A plasmid multilocus sequence typing (pMLST) 
scheme was developed for typing of blaOXA-48 contain-
ing plasmids. Plasmid sequences were filtered from 
the reported whole genome sequence of the outbreak-
related K.  pneumoniae 1191100241 (Project 71587 
GenBank Assignment: AFXH00000000). Four contigs 
were identified and PCR and conventional sequencing 
enabled the determination of the order and orienta-
tion of the contigs as well as the closure of the remain-
ing gaps in the sequence. A basic local alignment 
search tool (BLAST) search identified four plasmids 
with a similar backbone: pCTXM360 K.  pneumoniae 
(GenBank accession number: EU938349.1); pNDM-
HK E.  coli (GenBank accession number: HQ451074.1); 
pEL60 Erwinia amylovora (GenBank accession number: 
AY422214.1); pCTX-M3 C.  freundii (GenBank accession 
number: AF550415.2). Initial analysis of these plas-
mids showed 11 potential sequences with sequence 
variation. 
The four sequences with most sequence variation were 
selected and their usefulness for typing was validated 
in 13 OXA-48 encoding plasmids: Plasmids from six iso-
lates were from the current outbreak (as was the whole 
genome sequenced isolate), one isolate was possibly 
outbreak related, but from a different hospital, and six 
Figure 1
Schematic representation of polymerase chain reaction-
based screening procedures used during an outbreak 
of OXA-48 positive Enterobacteriaceae in a hospital, 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 2009–2011
PCR: polymerase chain reaction; CRE: carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae.




OXA -48 negative  
Negative  
Culture on CRE agar (Oxoid 
Brilliance CRE Agar) and 
McConkey agar (Oxoid) for every 




PCR for OXA-48 
(confirmation) 
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isolates were obtained from six different geographic 
locations in the Netherlands, and considered unrelated 
to this outbreak. Four of the six plasmids from the iso-
lates unrelated to the outbreak had clear sequence dif-
ferences compared to the K.  pneumoniae 1191100241 
OXA-48 plasmid, whereas only one of the six plasmids 
obtained from outbreak-related isolates had clear dif-
ferences. The plasmid from the isolate that was pos-
sibly outbreak related but from a different hospital 
had a nucleotide difference. From these data we con-
cluded that the chosen sequences provided sufficient 
resolution. 
We did not determine the incompatibility group or per-
formed transfer experiments because the incompat-
ibility class could be deduced from the whole genome 
sequence data and pMLST is more discriminatory than 
the determination of the incompatibility group. Isolates 
for plasmid typing were selected from 15 patients 
who had at least two different OXA-48 containing 
Enterobacteriaceae, of which one K. pneumoniae, max-
imising diversity in species.
Results
Infection control measures
Prior to the notification of the outbreak of OXA-48 posi-
tive Enterobacteriaceae, a certain number of steps had 
already been taken to contain K. pneumoniae with ESBL 
phenotype, which had been detected in the hospital 
from 2009 onwards (Table 2). After notification in May 
2011 of K.  pneumoniaeCTX-M-15 simultaneously posi-
tive for OXA-48, in clinical cultures of two patients who 
had been recently discharged from hospital A, an out-
break team was assembled on 1 June. PCR procedures 
for OXA-48 screening were fully operational on 10 June 
2011. On 18 July 2011, all infection control measures as 
described in the ‘Infection control’ section had been 
implemented and accurate flagging of all patients in 
hospital database systems had been realised.
Screening
Retrospective screening
The identification of two patients with K. pneumoniae-
CTX-M-15;OXA-48 by other laboratories in March and 
April 2011 alerted to the outbreak upon notification on 
31 May 2011. These two OXA-48 carriers are included 
in the group of the retrospectively screened patients in 
further analyses.
Furthermore, retrospective evaluation of all stored 
K.  pneumoniae isolates (n=408) revealed 85 isolates 
harbouring OXA-48, from 43 patients (Figure 2); 77 iso-
lates were also positive for CTX-M-15. The ‘oldest’ OXA-
48 isolate (also harbouring CTX-M-15) was identified in 
a clinical sample obtained on 10 September 2010.
Detection of OXA-48 carriers by prospective hospital 
screening or clinical sample testing
Accurate flagging of all patients in the hospital data-
base systems as ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’ risk was 
realised on 18 July 2011. Between outbreak detection 
(31 May 2011) and full implementation of the flagging 
system (18 July 2011) prospective hospital screening or 
testing of clinical samples revealed OXA-48 carriage 
in 30 hospitalised patients (Figure 2). The 30 patients 
detected through prospective screening or clinical 
samples were different from the 45 patients found by 
retrospective screening. Two of these 30 patients were 
Date Measure
Jun 2010
- Separation of two ICU-units 
- Increased attention for hygiene measures
- Enhanced cleaning of ICU-units
Aug 2010 Start twice weekly throat and rectum screening for K. pneumoniae with ESBL phenotype in ICU patients
Sep 2010 Start making of daily summary of all relevant microorganisms on ICU
Oct 2010 Hand hygiene promotion on ICU
Mar 2011
- Cohorting of patients with ESBL K. pneumoniae
- Dedicated nursing staff in two ICU-units
- Strict isolationa for patients with a ESBL-like microorganism on ICU
- ICU discharge cultures
- Strict isolationa for all patients transferred from ICU to ward until ICU discharge cultures are negative
- Contact-droplet isolationb for non-ICU patients with HRMO
May 2011 Start of SDD in ICU prior to the relocation of the hospital into a new building
Jun 2011 Notification of OXA-48 positive Enterobacteriaceae outbreak. Start PCR based screening for OXA-48 and pre-emptive isolation as described in Table 1
July 2011 All patients are flagged according to risk categories for EnterobacteriaceaeOXA-48 carriage or exposure
ESBL: extended spectrum beta-lactamase; HRMO: highly resistant microorganism; ICU: intensive care unit; PCR: polymerase chain reaction; 
SDD: selective decontamination of the digestive tract.
a Strict isolation: single isolation room, use of gown, gloves and mask.
b Contact-droplet isolation: single room, use of gloves and mask.
Table 2
Control measures for extended-spectrum beta-lactamases (ESBL) and OXA-48 producing Enterobacteriaceae during an 
outbreak of OXA-48 positive Enterobacteriaceae, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 2009–2011
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identified in August, but both had been hospitalised 
from before 18 July.
In total, 72,147 patients had been admitted during the 
outbreak period (1 July 2009 until 18 July 2011). By the 
time flagging of patients was completely operational 
(18 July 2011), 64 of these patients had already been 
categorised as OXA-48 carriers. Of the 72,083 remain-
ing, 4,722 were classified as high-risk and 67,361 as 
medium-risk, of whom 3,394 (72%) and 4,133 (6%) 
were screened respectively post-discharge or on read-
mission (Table 1). This yielded 43 newly identified OXA-
48 carriers (35 from the high-risk and eight from the 
medium-risk patient group). The last patient with OXA-
48 was detected through post-discharge screening on 
14 April 2012. 
In all, of 73 OXA-48 carriers detected prospectively, 
five were detected via clinical cultures while 68 were 
identified through screening. All 68 had documented 
rectal carriage and 13 (19%) also had throat carriage.
In total, prospective and retrospective analysis led to 
118 OXA-48 carriers being found (Figure 2).
In a period after the outbreak starting from 18 July 2011 
until 18 July 2012, 1,921 patients (not admitted between 
1 July 2009 up to 17 July 2011 included) were screened 
for OXA-48 carriage after seven days hospitalisation or 
during point-prevalence surveys. In this period three 
patients with OXA-48 Enterobacteriaceae (one C. freun-
dii, one E. coli and one K. pneumoniae) were detected 
through point-prevalence survey. Another patient had 
OXA-48 K.  pneumoniae in a clinical culture obtained 
at hospital admission. All findings could not be epide-
miologically linked to the outbreak and both K.  pneu-
moniae isolates did not belong to the outbreak strain 
based on AFLP-typing. These episodes were, therefore, 
considered new introductions. 
Patient characteristics
In 21 of 118 patients (18%) EnterobactericeaeOXA-48 was 
associated with clinical signs of infection and all-cause 
30-day mortality was 29% (n=6) and 13% (n=13) for 
patients with infection (n=21) and colonisation only 
(n=97), respectively (Table 3). 
Before the transmigration of both hospital locations (16 
May 2011), 107 patients with OXA-48 Enterobacteriaceae 
had been hospitalised and they had a median of seven 
roommates per admission (interquartile range (IQR): 
3–15), which generated a median of 1.04 (IQR: 0.6–3.0) 
new contact patients per admission day. After trans-
migration (and before 18 July 2011) 49 OXA-48 carriers 
were hospitalised with a median of 0 roommates (IQR: 
0–4), generating a median of 0 (IQR: 0–1.56) new con-
tacts per admission day (p<0.001).
Figure 2
Epidemic curve of detection date of first OXA-48 positive isolate per patient during an outbreak of OXA-48 positive 
Enterobacteriaceae, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 2009–2011 (n=118 patients)a
PCR: polymerase chain reaction.
The first two patients were detected in March and April 2011, but notified in May 2011, by other laboratories and are included in the 
retrospective analysis. Before 10 June PCRs were already performed, but the automated PCR was not fully operational until 10 June so this date 
was considered the start of PCR-based screening. The retrospective detection was performed on stored Klebsiella pneumoniae samples dating 
back to 1 January 2009, with the oldest positive sample for OXA-48 dating back from 10 September 2010.


















Post-discharge screening including 
screening on readmission (n=43 patients)a
Hospital screening (n=30 patients)




Microbiology and antibiotic susceptibility
In 55 of 118 patients (47%) OXA-48 was detected in 
more than one Enterobacteriaceae species; patients 
had five (n=1), four (n=3), three (n=13), or two (n=38) 
different species. OXA-48 was most frequently iden-
tified in K.  pneumoniae (n=99 patients, 83.9%) and 
E. coli (n=58 patients, 49.2%) (Table 3).
Depending on breakpoints used, at least 85% of OXA-
48 isolates (K. pneumoniae and E. coli) were suscepti-
ble to meropenem and amikacin (Table 4).
All OXA-48 K. pneumoniae isolates with CTX-M group 1 
ESBL had CTX-M-15 (n=64). Of these 64 patients, 18 
also had K.  pneumoniaeOXA-48 isolates (without ESBL), 
and both isolates were used to describe antibiotic sus-
ceptibility (Table 4). 
In K. pneumoniae the combination of OXA-48 and CTX-
M-15 was associated with resistance to cefepime, cefo-
taxime, and gentamicin. Using various Clinical and 
Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) and European 
Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing 
(EUCAST) breakpoints, susceptibility to imipenem of 
K.  pneumoniaeOXA-48 isolates (without ESBL) ranged 
from 12% (CLSI 2010 updated breakpoints [23]) to 83% 
(CLSI 2006 breakpoints [24]) and ranged from 3% to 
72%, respectively, for K.  pneumoniaeOXA-48;CTX-M-15. All 
K.  pneumoniaeOXA-48 isolates tested (n=108) were non-
susceptible to ertapenem (MIC >0.25 mg/L), as were 45 
of 49 E. coli (Table 4).
Molecular epidemiology of Klebsiella 
pneumoniae
285 K.  pneumoniae isolates from patients admit-
ted during the outbreak were included for analysis; 
62 OXA-48/CTX-M-1 group, 158 CTX-M-1 group (with-
out OXA-48), 49 with OXA-48 (without CTX-M-1 group 
ESBL) and 16 with non-CTX-M-1 group ESBL. Of these, 
203 isolates were considered to be clonally linked; 62 
OXA-48/CTX-M-15, 107 CTX-M-1 group (without OXA-
48) and 34 with OXA-48 (without CTX-M-1 group ESBL) 
(Figure 3 and 4). 
Among the 82 non-outbreak type K.  pneumoniae iso-
lates, 50 different types were detected, yielding one 
cluster of seven isolates (OXA-48 negative, CTX-M-1 
group positive (n=5), OXA-48 negative, non-CTX-M-1 
group ESBL (n=2)), one of five (all OXA-48 negative, 
CTX-M-1 group positive), six of three (4 clusters OXA-48 
negative, CTX-M-1 group positive; 1 cluster with OXA-
48 negative non-CTX-M-1 group or CTX-M-1 group ESBL 
positive; and 1 cluster with 2 OXA-48 positive ESBL 
negative and 1 OXA-48 negative non-CTX-M-1 group 
ESBL positive), 10 of two isolates and 32 unique iso-
lates. There were no clusters with more than two OXA-
48 positive isolates among the non-outbreak isolates.
From September 2010 onwards clonal types K.  pneu-
moniaeOXA-48;CTX-M-15 were identified, followed by an 
increase in clonal types with OXA-48 but without 
CTX-M-15 in June 2011. These findings are compatible 
with cross-transmission of clonal K.  pneumoniae with 
considerable heterogeneity in the presence of OXA-
48 and CTX-M-15. OXA-48 encoding plasmids from 39 
of 41 isolates (95%) belonging to 13 different species 
obtained during the outbreak from 15 patients were 
identical (based on pMLST), suggesting inter-species 
transmission of plasmids.
Table 3
Characteristics of OXA-48 positive patients during an 
outbreak of OXA-48 positive Enterobacteriaceae in a 
hospital, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 2009–2011 (n=118)
Characteristics of OXA-48 positive 
patients




Sex, n male (%) 67 (57)
Age in years, median (IQR) 70.6 (60.7–78.0)
Median length of stay in days per 
admission (IQR) 4 (1–14)
Median number of admissions during 
outbreak period (IQR) 3 (2–6)
Number of patients admitted to ICU 
during outbreak period (%) 52 (44)
Number of admissions per specialty (%)







Combination of OXA-48 positive organisms found, n
Only Klebsiella pneumoniae 51
K. pneumoniae and Escherichia coli 25
K. pneumoniae and othera 6
K. pneumoniae and E. coli and othera 17
Only E. coli 9
E. coli and othera 7
Only othera 3
Infection with OXA-48 positive 
Enterobacteriaceae, n (%) 21 (18)
Patients infected by infection site,






30 day mortality after first positive 
isolate, n (%) 19 (16)
Infection:  
deaths/patients infected (%) 6/21 (29)
Colonisation:  
deaths/patients colonised (%) 13/97 (13)
ICU: intensive care unit; IQR: interquartile range.
a  Other organisms included Klebsiella oxytoca (n=8), Enterobacter 
cloacae (n=7), Morganella morganii (n=6), Citrobacter freundii 
(n=3), Serratia marcescens (n=3), Enterobacter aerogenes (n=2), 
Citrobacter braakii, Citrobacter farmeri, Citrobacter koseri, 
Citrobacter youngae, Escherichia fergusonii, Klebsiella ozaenae, 
Kluyvera species and Raoultella planticola (all n=1).
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Table 4
Susceptibility of first OXA-48 positive ESBL positive and negative isolate per patient per organism as determined by Vitek 2 









48 and CTX-M-15 
(n=64)
E. coli OXA-48,
no ESBL  
(n=49)
E. coli OXA-48
and CTX-M-15  
(n=6)
MIC90 S, n (%) MIC90 S, n (%) MIC90 S, n (%) MIC90 S, n (%)
Meropenem 2 ≥16 1 1
Breakpoint CLSI 2010-U 1 – 44 (85) – 47 (73) – 49 (100) – 6 (100)
Breakpoint EUCAST 2 – 49 (94) – 49 (77) – 49 (100) – 6 (100)
Breakpoint CLSI 2006 4 – 49 (94) – 49 (77) – 49 (100) – 6 (100)
Imipenem 8 ≥16 2 4
Breakpoint CLSI 2010-U 1 – 6 (12) – 2 (3) – 35 (71) – 1 (17)
Breakpoint EUCAST 2 – 18 (35) – 15 (23) – 46 (94) – 3 (50)
Breakpoint CLSI 2006 4 – 43 (83) – 46 (72) – 47 (96) – 6 (100)
Ertapenem 0.25b 32 0 (0)c ≥32 0 (0)d 2 4 (8)e 2 0 (0)f
Amikacin 8 ≤2 51 (98) 8 61 (95) ≤2 47 (96) 16 5 (83)
Ciprofloxacin 0.5 ≥4 16 (31) ≥4 0 (0) ≥4 42 (86) ≥4 1 (17)
Trimethoprim/
sulfamethoxazole 2 ≥16 14 (27) ≥16 0 (0) ≥16 43 (88) ≥16 1 (17)
Gentamicin 2 ≥16 45 (87) ≥16 0 (0) 8 44 (90) ≥16 4 (67)
Cefotaxime = ceftriaxon 1 ≤1 47 (90) ≥64 0 (0) 2 44 (90) ≥64 0 (0)
Cefepime 1 ≤1 52 (100) ≥64 0 (0) ≤1 49 (100) 32 3 (50)
CLSI: Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute; E. coli: Escherichia coli; ESBL: extended-spectrum beta-lactamases; EUCAST: European 
committee on antimicrobial susceptibility testing; K. pneumoniae: Klebsiella pneumoniae; MIC: minimum inhibitory concentration; S: 
susceptible. 
a  Susceptibility according to EUCAST-breakpoints unless otherwise specified.
b  Screening breakpoint.
c  Only 49 of the total 52 K. pneumoniae OXA-48, no ESBL were tested for ertapenem.
d  Only 59 of the total 64 K. pneumoniae OXA-48 and CTX-M-15 isolates were tested for ertapenem.
e  Only 44 of the total 49 E. coli OXA-48, no ESBL isolates were tested for ertapenem.
f  Only five of the total six E. coli OXA-48 and CTX-M-15 isolates were tested for ertapenem. 
Figure 4
Epidemic curve of outbreak strain Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates producing extended-spectrum beta-lactamases (ESBL) 


















OXA-48 positive, CTX-M group 1 negative (n=34 isolates)
OXA-48 positive, CTX-M group 1 positive (n=62 isolates)
OXA-48 negative, CTX-M group 1 positive (n=107 isolates)
Isolates included in the Figure, detected after 18 July 2011, are from patients admitted during the outbreak period, but screened after the 
outbreak period in post-discharge and re-admission screening.
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Figure 3
AFLP-typing of 285 Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates, during an outbreak of OXA-48 positive Enterobacteriaceae, Rotterdam, 
the Netherlands, 2009–2012
AFLP: amplified fragment length polymorphism; ESBL: extended-spectrum beta-lactamases; neg: negative; pos: positive.







































































































































































































































































































One K.  pneumoniae outbreak isolate was sequenced 
and categorised as ST395, and 147 isolates also under-
went pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) typing, 
yielding comparable results to AFLP typing (with regard 
to classification as outbreak-related or not) for 143 iso-
lates (data not shown).
Discussion
We describe here the successful control of a large hospi-
tal outbreak of OXA-48 producing Enterobacteriaceae, 
which started with nosocomial transmission of K. pneu-
moniaeCTX-M-15 that apparently acquired OXA-48. Among 
outbreak strains, there was considerable inter- and 
intra-species heterogeneity in antibiotic susceptibility 
and resistance genes, and circumstantial evidence of 
cross-species transfer of OXA-48 containing plasmids. 
Before the hospital-wide implementation of classical 
infection control measures and large-scaled PCR-based 
screening for carriage with OXA-48 containing bacteria, 
as described here, the outbreak had persisted, partly 
unnoticed and insufficiently controlled, for two years. 
In absence of other resistance genes, OXA-48 expres-
sion usually results in low-level resistance, which may 
hamper laboratory detection. Co-production of ESBL 
and changes in permeability and in efflux pumps are 
usually needed for higher resistance levels [2]. In this 
hospital CLSI 2006 breakpoints were used during the 
outbreak period, which implied that MICs for imipenem 
and meropenem ≤4 mg/L were considered susceptible. 
Although the susceptibility breakpoint for both anti-
biotics had been reduced to MIC ≤1 mg/L by CLSI in 
2010, even at these new breakpoints 78% (91/116) and 
7% (8/116) of K.  pneumoniaeOXA-48, and 100% (55/55) 
and 65% (36/55) of E.  coliOXA-48 isolates would have 
been considered susceptible to meropenem and imi-
penem, respectively. Based on EUCAST guidelines 84% 
(98/116) and 28% (33/116) of K. pneumoniaeOXA-48, and 
100% (55/55) and 89% (49/55) of E.  coliOXA-48 isolates 
would have been considered susceptible to meropenem 
and imipenem, respectively. Ertapenem susceptibility 
testing (using the screening breakpoint of >0.25 mg/L) 
would have detected 128 of the 132 OXA-48 isolates 
(97%) with meropenem MIC ≤1 mg/L, and is, therefore, 
the carbapenem of choice when screening for OXA-48. 
This phenotypic variability among OXA-48 containing 
bacteria represents a major threat for unnoticed spread 
of this resistance gene. Large-scale gene detection, 
routine testing for ertapenem susceptibility, or novel 
phenotypic methods (such as chromogenic media) may 
be needed to prevent unnoticed dissemination. The 
latter methods however, yield considerable variation in 
sensitivity for OXA-48 detection, with 84% for carbap-
enem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) agar [25] and 
100% for the Carbapenemase Nordmann-Poirel (Carba 
NP) test [26]. 
As with most hospital outbreaks, the simultaneous 
implementation of interventions and lack of quantita-
tive evaluation of adherence to these interventions 
precludes a truly scientific analysis of their effec-
tiveness. Our findings suggest that contact isolation 
measures using single rooms with individual sanitary 
facilities attributed to controlling transmission. This 
was feasible as two old hospital buildings had trans-
migrated to a new building with more single rooms, 
shortly before outbreak detection. Naturally this 
migration might have influenced infection control also 
in other ways, such through differences in building 
structure that could not be quantified. Furthermore, 
widespread knowledge of an ongoing outbreak (with 
significant attention by the lay press) since June 2011 
may also have contributed to better adherence to basic 
infection control measures. Based on the data availa-
ble there was no evidence of environmental contamina-
tion or carriage among healthcare personnel with the 
outbreak strain.  
The largest proportion of patients had been treated 
in ICU, suggesting that this was the epicentre of the 
outbreak. Yet, detection bias due to higher culture 
frequency is likely. Moreover, most identification 
was based on either retrospective or post-discharge 
screening and many patients had been treated in dif-
ferent wards. Therefore, more sophisticated analyses 
are needed to determine the relative importance of dif-
ferent wards in the outbreak. 
Selective decontamination of the digestive tract (SDD) 
has been associated with eradication (or suppres-
sion) of resistant Gram-negative bacteria in the gut 
[27-29]. SDD (using tobramycin and polymyxin E) was 
introduced in the ICU in hospital A in May 2011, just 
before the transition to the new facility and hospital-
wide implementation of control measures. SDD was not 
intended to eliminate OXA-48 carriage, but was imple-
mented for all eligible patients because of its presumed 
benefits on patient outcome [30]. Because of the tim-
ing of events it will be difficult to quantify the role of 
SDD in controlling this outbreak. Preliminary analyses 
do not identify an immediate change in the numbers of 
hospitalised OXA-48 carriers (data not shown). 
The first detected OXA-48 isolate originated from 
September 2010, but it cannot be excluded that OXA-
48 was already present in the hospital before that 
date. Although many isolates with an ESBL phenotype 
had been stored, isolates with minimally elevated MICs 
for carbapenems were not. Furthermore, screening for 
ESBL-carriage was implemented in ICU in June 2010 
and in other departments in August 2010, and hos-
pital-wide PCR-based screening for OXA-48 carriage 
started in June 2011. In addition, OXA-48 carriers may 
lose their carrier status which will reduce detection in 
post-discharge screening. Therefore, underreporting 
of OXA-48 carriage is likely. Yet, we do not assume 
OXA-48 was circulating for many years in the hospital. 
The oldest OXA-48 isolate originated from a culture 
obtained in September 2010, and more than 40 isolates 
clonally linked to the outbreak strain (Figure 3) were 
detected before, but none of them harboured OXA-48. 
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This strongly suggests widespread circulation of the 
ESBL-producing strain without OXA-48 in the hospital 
before September 2010. Indeed, our hypothesis is that 
the ESBL-producing outbreak strain was circulating in 
the hospital and acquired the OXA-48-containing plas-
mid from another patient, most probably coming from 
an endemic region. Risk factors for OXA-48 acquisition, 
duration of carriage of OXA-48 after hospital discharge 
and its transmissibility in the community setting are 
currently investigated. 
In the early phases of outbreak containment several 
important decisions had to be made, in the absence 
of scientific evidence. The tentative start of nosoco-
mial OXA-48 transmission needed to be defined on 
incomplete data. Therefore, a 14-month margin after 
the ‘oldest’ isolate, which was identified at the end 
of May 2011, was taken. Furthermore, it was known 
that Shewanella spp. can carry OXA-48. Yet, the out-
break was considered to be caused by K.  pneumo-
niae only. As we detected patients with non-Klebsiella 
Enterobacteriaceae carrying OXA-48 after implement-
ing PCR-based screening of rectal swabs, it was subse-
quently decided to include Enterobacteriaceae (but not 
Shewanella spp.) in our case definition. Risk categori-
sation was based on proximity of patients to identified 
OXA-48 carriers. For feasibility reasons we decided to 
base this risk on ‘room sharing’ only, although there 
are many more potential risk factors. Finally, based on 
limited data it was decided not to further investigate a 
potential role of colonised healthcare workers in this 
outbreak, nor to change environmental cleaning pro-
cedures and antibiotic policies. Enforced cleaning and 
antimicrobial stewardship were considered instrumen-
tal in controlling a large OXA-48 outbreak in Spain [31]. 
In our setting, there were no documented events of 
nosocomial transmission of OXA-48 Enterobacteriaceae 
after 18 July 2011 without these measures. We have 
not performed a detailed analysis of antibiotic use, 
but in the cohort of patients who were admitted dur-
ing the outbreak period and who were tested for OXA-
48 carriage (and considered non-carrier based on test 
results; n=11,386) carbapenem use was 0.67 days per 
100 admission days. Unfortunately, days in ICU could 
not be included in this analysis. 
After outbreak detection other healthcare facilities in 
the region were immediately informed and advised to 
screen patients who had been admitted to hospital A 
during the outbreak period. Some hospitals also iso-
lated such patients awaiting culture results. To the 
best of our knowledge, there were no additional car-
riers identified through screening in other hospitals. 
There was one secondary case of OXA-48 carriage in 
a long-term care facility that had received an OXA-48 
carrier after treatment in hospital A. Extensive screen-
ing failed to identify further spread. 
Some important lessons can be learned from this out-
break. First, uncontrolled spread of ESBL-producing 
bacteria, even at relatively low levels, can turn into an 
outbreak of carbapenemase-producing bacteria, most 
probably after horizontal gene transfer. The likelihood 
of horizontal gene transfer will increase if admission 
rates of patients with unidentified carriage with such 
bacteria increases. Currently, this rate appears to be 
low in the Netherlands and Belgium. In this hospital 
four new OXA-48 carriers, unrelated to the outbreak, 
were discovered due to extensive screening of 1,921 
patients. In Belgium, eight OXA-48 positive isolates 
were detected among 4,564 Enterobacteriaceae iso-
lates (one isolate per patient) [32]. Second, because 
of the large heterogeneity of antibiotic susceptibili-
ties routine phenotypic detection tests may be insuf-
ficient for identification of all isolates involved in an 
outbreak. Third, once detected, this large outbreak 
could be controlled – in short time – presumably with 
classical infection control measures, although it was 
impossible to quantify the contribution of individual 
measures and the role of special circumstances, such 
as the relocation of the hospital into a new facility. 
Because the outbreak might have remained unnoticed 
for some time however, the resources needed to iden-
tify its extent, as well as to screen potential carriers 
of OXA-48 Enterobacteriaceae were extensive (74,884 
PCRs were performed for OXA-48 screening in 2011 
and 2012). We, therefore, recommend implementing 
risk-stratified screening for carriage of these highly 
resistant bacteria, followed by barrier precautions for 
carriers detected, in order to prevent the need of costly 
control measures after detection of an unnoticed out-
break. Risk factor analyses for OXA-48 carriage are, 
therefore, warranted. 
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